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Within days of the 2006 mid-term elections, political
commentators began discussing the vast sums of money that candidates
in 2008 will have to raise in order to have a viable candidacy in the
primaries or general election. Analysts noted that aggregate spending on
behalf of candidates for federal office in 2006 would likely be roughly
$2.6 billion, an eighteen-percent increase over the comparable spending
in the 2002 mid-term election.' The amounts raised in the first two
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1. Barbara Borst, Campaign Spending Up in US. Congressional Races, USA
TODAY, Oct. 29, 2006 (reporting a prediction made by the Center for Responsive
Politics), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-10-29-
campaign-spendingx.htm. According to the Federal Election Commission,
congressional candidates alone raised 30 percent more and spent 36 percent more in
2006 than congressional candidates in 2004. See Press Release, Federal Election
Commission, Congressional Campaigns Spend $966 Million through Mid October
(Nov. 2, 2006) available at, http://www.fec.gov/press/press2006/20061102can/2006
1102can.html. The larger figure predicted by the Center for Responsive Politics
includes funds raised by parties and interest groups for congressional races in those
years in addition to the sums raised by the candidates.
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quarters of 2007 by candidates for President were similarly
2
unprecedented.
Concurrent with these developments, campaign finance reform
initiatives have continued to surface. Recent ethics reform legislation,
for example, includes a provision to increase campaign finance
transparency by requiring lobbyists who bundle small individual
contributions for the benefit of candidates to disclose the candidates,
political parties, or other recipients for whom they raise money and the
3
aggregate amounts raised in this way. At the same time, lawmakers
have renewed their efforts to restrain certain types of soft money
fundraising by introducing the 527 Reform Act of 2007. 4 In the courts,5
the sponsors of the McCain-Feingold 2002 campaign finance law
(Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 or BCRA)6 have persisted in
their attempts to compel the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to
adopt regulations specifying which organizations must register as
political committees under the federal campaign finance law (FECA)
7
and be subject to its fundraising 8 and disclosure rules. 9 In part prodded
2. The Campaign Finance Institute, The Presidential Campaigns Are Setting
Records, http://www.cfinst.org/pr/prRelease.aspx?ReleaselD=155 (stating that the
presidential candidates raised a total of $277 million in the first six months of 2007).
3. See Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (2007), § 204.
4. See 527 Reform Act of 2007, S. 463, 110th Cong. (2007), H.R. 420, 110th
Cong. (2007).
5. See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 424 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2006),
(involving a suit filed in 2004 by sponsors of the McCain-Feingold legislation in the
House of Representatives). The plaintiffs alleged that the FEC had failed in its duty
to enforce the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act because it never promulgated a rule
outlining what actions or characteristics make an organization a political committee
subject to the Federal Election Campaign Act. The court ordered the FEC to
promulgate such a rule or else offer an explanation why it believed case-by-case
enforcement was the proper method for enforcement.
6. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (2002) (codified as part of FECA, infra note 7).
7. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et. seq. (2000).
8. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2000) (limiting contributions made by
individuals to political committees to $5,000 per election cycle), 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)
(2000) (prohibiting corporations and unions from contributing money from their
general treasuries to political committees).
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by these proceedings, the FEC recently announced a series of
enforcement actions against groups that had failed to register as political
committees,10 and it published an explanation and defense of its decision
to enforce certain campaign finance violations on a case-by-case basis
rather than by promulgating a regulation of the sort reformers insist is11
necessary. Clearly campaign finance law and regulation is still in flux.
This provides an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of reforms
instituted to date as well as current efforts of reformers to revise and
improve perceived deficiencies in the existing statutory and regulatory
framework. An assessment of this kind requires, however, that we step
back and revisit the objectives of campaign finance legislation. At least
three primary purposes suggest themselves.
First and foremost, campaign fundraising should not provide an
occasion for buying or selling a legislative agenda or specific legislative
proposals, influencing other legislative action or inaction (e.g., in
connection with nominations, appointments, or government contracts), or
even granting special access to lawmakers and their staffs.
Second, campaign finance rules should apply with equal force to
all participants in elections who are similarly situated from a functional
9. See 2 U.S.C. § 433 (2000) (describing registration requirements), 2 U.S.C. §
434 (2000) (describing reporting requirements).
10. See MURs 5430 and 5466 (August 24, 2007) (fining Americans Coming
Together (ACT)); MUR 5753 (December 13, 2006) (fining the League of
Conservation Voters, two 527 groups, and the organization's Action Fund); MUR
5487 (February 28, 2007) (fining the Progress for America Voting Fund); MURs
5511 and 5525 (December 13, 2006) (fining Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for
Truth); MUR 5754 (Dec. 13, 2006) (fining the MoveOn.org Voter Fund). All of
these conciliation agreements and the associated documents are available at
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqs/searcheqs?SUBMIT=continue. Most of the MURs cited in
this note are summarized in FEC Notice 2007-3 ("Political Committee Status"), 72
Fed. Reg. 5595, 5604-5605 (Feb. 7, 2007) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. Pt. 100). In
addition to paying the fines, each organization agreed to register as a political
committee under FECA if it continued to engage in the activities that were the
subject of the enforcement proceedings.
11. See FEC Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, and infra note 125 and
accompanying text. The plaintiffs in Shays found the Notice unacceptable and filed
a motion alleging that the agency had failed to comply satisfactorily with the court's
directive. The court disagreed. See Shays v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 2007 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 63688, 2007 WL 2446159 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2007).
point of view. Loopholes and the unfairness surrounding them may arise
when rules are interpreted so as to permit labels or technical distinctions
rather than substance to determine outcomes. Fairness requires that
function, not form, determine the proper application of campaign finance
obligations and entitlements.
Finally, because of the protection afforded speech by the First
Amendment, the articulation of rules must be clear enough and their
application sufficiently certain that affected parties can understand their
rights and the limits of those rights, so that they can make plans and
adopt strategies in reliance on the rules. Thus, both constitutional
considerations and fairness to participants in an election require that legal
criteria be sufficiently fixed in their meanings and purposes that
reasonable people acting in good faith can anticipate the consequences of
their actions.
This Article explores certain tensions inherent in achieving these
three goals simultaneously. The starting point of my analysis is a recent
empirical study detailing the extent to which, and the ways in which,
organizations exempt from taxation under § 527 or § 501(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code (the Code) 12 engage in campaign activity by
operating as part of networks of commonly managed nonprofits. Part I
discusses the legal and policy concerns that have triggered campaign
finance reforms in the last decade. Specifically, it examines problems
raised by politically active exempt organizations that operate as part of
networks of related organizations. Part II describes the results of the
empirical study about the incidence and characteristics of networks of
politically active exempt organizations that was issued under the
auspices of the Campaign Finance Institute. 13 Based largely upon the
study's findings, I develop certain recommendations for assessing the
electoral mission of individual advocacy organizations operating as part
of networks. I refer to my recommendations, which are designed to take
into account the complex interactions between and among such
12. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
13. See Stephen R. Weissman and Kara D. Ryan, The Campaign Finance
Institute, Non-Profit Interest Groups' Election Activities and Federal Campaign
Finance Policy: A Working Paper (2006), http://www.cfinst.org/booksreports/pdf/
NonprofitsWorkingPaper.pdf. A revised version was printed (without the
appendices) in 54 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 21 (2006).
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politically active affiliated organizations, as a "network approach." Part
III examines First Amendment difficulties raised by analyzing such
organizations using a network approach. It focuses on a line of cases
holding that the government cannot condition tax and other financial
benefits on a potential recipient surrendering free speech rights that it
otherwise would have unless there is an alternate channel available for
the recipient to exercise those rights. Part IV asks whether this alternate-
channel doctrine is inconsistent with using a network approach to
classify exempt organizations as political committees. It also examines
whether the doctrine of respecting corporate and entity boundaries except
in unusual circumstances would run counter to a network approach. In
Part V, the FEC's use of contextual analysis, such as a network approach
would entail, is discussed and the potential impact of the Supreme
Court's decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life is considered.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION
Since 1971, when it enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act,
(FECA),14 Congress has attempted to prevent corruption or the
appearance of corruption in federal elections resulting either from
campaign contributions made to the candidates and political parties or
from expenditures made on their behalf. In general, Congress has
attempted to achieve its objective in two ways: (1) by enacting limits on
the amount of contributions that individuals and entities can give to
candidates or parties, by year or by election cycle (the "amount"
restrictions),15 and (2) by requiring disclosure on the part of those who
receive and spend campaign funds. 16 A third strategy for preventing
corruption, introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century, has been
to prohibit corporations, labor unions, and national banks from spending
their general treasury funds on certain kinds of campaign activity (the
• • 17
"source" restrictions). Although these entities cannot spend funds from
14. See supra note 7.
15. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2000).
16. 2 U.S.C. §§ 433, 434 (2000).
17. The source restrictions are now part of FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)
(2000). For the history of the rules limiting corporate funding of election activities,
see FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152-55 (2003). For the history of restrictions
their general treasuries,' 8 they are free to set up political action
committees, or PACs, and solicit contributions to them from related
individuals.' 9  The PACs are then able to make contributions to
candidates and parties and to engage in all forms of campaign spending.
Money raised in accordance with the preceding disclosure, amount, and
source restrictions is known as "hard money." Everything else is "soft
money. 2 °
The Supreme Court closely polices Congress's efforts to regulate
campaign financing in order to prevent Congress from violating the First
Amendment by restricting political speech through regulations that are
overly broad or vague or that cannot be justified by the government
interest served. In 2003, the Court upheld against a First Amendment
attack a provision of the McCain-Feingold reform legislation that
prohibited candidates and political parties from raising and spending soft
money either for themselves or for state organizations. 21 The Court also
validated companion provisions prohibiting political parties (federal,
22
state, or local) from raising soft money for § 527 organizations or for §
501(c) organizations that make expenditures or disbursements on behalf
of federal candidates.23
on union funding of campaign activities, see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 116-
17 (2003).
18. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2007).
19. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2000). Corporations may solicit
contributions for their PACs from shareholders and executive and administrative
employees (and the families of all of these), see 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) (2000),
and labor organizations may solicit contributions for their PACs from members and
their families, see 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(ii) (2000).
20. On the meaning of the term "soft money," see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-
23. The term did not appear in FECA or the implementing regulations until the
enactment of BCRA in 2002. Even now, although the term appears in the title to §
441 i of FECA, it is not defined in the statute.
21. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142-73.
22. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441i(d)(1)-(2) (2000); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 174-81.
The prohibition does not apply in the case of a 527 organization that is registered
with the FEC as a political committee or that is a nonfederal candidate or nonfederal
party committee.
23. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d)(1) (2000); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 181-83
(2003).
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Since the enactment of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance
legislation, reformers have become concerned that certain nonprofit
organizations are becoming vehicles for evading the soft money
restrictions. In particular, attention has focused on groups organized
under § 527 of the Code, the provision for "political organizations."
Groups that qualify under that section are exempt from income tax on
contributions made to them and certain other revenues they generate to
the extent that these sums are segregated for use in influencing, or
attempting to influence, the nomination, appointment, or election of
24individuals for public office. In addition, contributors to such groups
are not liable for the gift tax when the amounts they contribute exceed
25the annual gift tax exclusion.
Some groups organized under § 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code are required to register as political committees with the FEC
because of the type and amount of their political activity. Once
registered, a group will be subject to the source, amount, and disclosure
26rules set forth in FECA with respect to its federal campaign activities.
Under FECA, registration with the FEC is required if a group raises or
spends more than $1,000 "for the purpose of influencing any election for
,,27federal office. In addition to this statutory requirement, the Supreme
Court has suggested that before an entity can be required to register with
the FEC, it must either be under the control of a candidate for federal
office or have the election or defeat of a federal candidate as its major
28purpose. Most commentators agree that the FECA registration
24. See I.R.C. §§ 527(a), (c)(1), (e)(2) (2000). The groups are, however,
taxable on their net investment income and certain capital gains, and they may be
taxable on other income that is not raised and spent for "exempt function" purposes
or is not properly segregated for such purposes. Section 527 of the Code applies to
activities designed to influence elections at the state or local as well as the federal
level, and it also extends to activities related to non-elective offices. The rules set
forth in FECA and its implementing regulations, in contrast, apply only to federal
activities and elective offices.
25. See I.R.C. § 250 l(a)(4) (2000).
26. A political committee is also permitted to maintain a non-federal account
to fund its non-federal activities. See 11 CFR § 106.6 (2007).
27. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(4)(A) (2000) (defining political committee), (8)(A)(i)
(2000) (defining contribution), (9)(A)(i) (2000) (defining expenditure).
28. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). According to the Supreme
Court in FEC v Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986), an
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requirement is triggered only if an organization satisfies both the
statutory and the judicially created tests.
2 9
Under current law, it is often unclear whether a 527 organization
that is active during a federal election conforms to these legal standards
and, as a consequence, must register as a political committee with the
FEC. Some 527 groups active in recent federal elections have registered
with the FEC as political committees and, thus, have voluntarily
submitted to FECA regulation. Other 527 groups have taken the
position that they did not need to register, either because their electoral
activities were not the type that trigger such regulation 30 or because their
FECA-type activities constituted a small part of their mission and
organization may become subject to the FECA registration requirement if its
independent expenditures become so "extensive" that "its major purpose may be
regarded as campaign activity." The MCFL formulation is ambiguous: it may mean
that an organization could become a political committee if independent spending
becomes its major purpose, or it may mean that "extensive" amounts of independent
spending may be an important, or even conclusive, indication that an organization's
major purpose is to influence the election of candidates for federal office.
"Independent expenditures" are defined as spending for express advocacy that is not
coordinated with a candidate or political party. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2000). The term
"express advocacy" refers to communications like "Elect Smith" or "Defeat Jones."
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 41-44, 80 (1976).
29. See FEC Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5596-97 (stating the FEC's
position). For a discussion of other authorities as well as the development of the
FEC's position, see Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and
Justifications for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1181, 1220-21 (2007).
30. According to these groups, only campaign activities that are "express
advocacy" count in determining whether an organization has satisfied either the
statutory or the judicially created standard. See Wis. Right to Life v. Paradise, 138
F.3d 1183, 1186 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 873 (1998); see also Nat'l
Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1323 (S.D.
Ala. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Mobile Republican Assemblies v. United States, 353
F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (10th Cir. 2003). The FEC agrees that only express advocacy
can be counted in assessing the extent of a group's expenditures for FECA purposes.
See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5597. However, it argues that the definition of
a contribution includes a much broader range of campaign related activities,
including communications that support or attack a candidate for federal office, even
if they do not expressly advocate the candidate's election or defeat. See id. at 5602.
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operations. 31 As a consequence, the latter groups have been able to raise
soft money, i.e., sums in excess of the hard-money limits 32 and
contributions made from unions' and corporations' general treasury
funds.33 Although it is primarily the unregistered 527 groups that have
been charged by critics with making it possible to circumvent the soft
money reforms enacted in 2002, it is also possible for groups described
in 501(c) of the Code to be implicated in circumvention. In 2006, for
example, the FEC found that an organization operating under § 501(c)(4)
of the Code should have registered as a political committee with the
FEC, and the agency indicated that it would continue to investigate
organizations active in political campaigns without regard to the section
of the Code underlying a group's exemption.
34
Whether an unregistered 527 or 501(c) group is operating within
the law or should be registered with the FEC depends upon three issues:
(1) what kind of electioneering activities are counted for determining
registration; (2) how extensive these electioneering activities must be for
a group to have influencing federal elections as its major purpose; and
(3) what method should be used to assess an organization's major
31. In response to its concern that many 527 groups have wrongly failed to
register, each Congress since 2004 has introduced a "527 Reform Act," designed to
require 527 groups engaged in even minimal amounts of certain kinds of election
activities to register with the FEC. See Reform of Section 527 Organizations, SA
2958, 109th Cong. (2006); Lobbying Accountability and Transparency Act, H.R.
4975, 109th Cong. (2006); 527 Reform Act of 2006, H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2006);
S. 1053, 109th Cong. (2005); 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005);
527 Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2005); 527 Reform Act of 2004, S.
2828, 108th Cong. (2004); 527 Reform Act of 2004, H.R. 5127, 108th Cong.
(2004). See also supra note 4.
32. More than 150 individuals contributed $100,000 or more and twenty-four
people gave $2,000,000 or more during the 2004 election. See PoliticalMoneyLine,
2004 Cycle Large Donors to CQLine's Key 527 Groups, http://www.fecinfo.com/cgi
-win/irs ef 527.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 (listing, based upon I.R.S. filings, large
contributors to 527 groups in the 2004 election cycle). Some of the 527 groups
listed on the website were registered as political committees under FECA and
maintained both federal and nonfederal accounts.
33. See Weissman and Ryan, supra note 13, at 90-91, who observe that,
although unions contributed large sums during the 2004 campaign to certain 527
groups not registered with the FEC, corporations contributed relatively little to them.
34. See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5605-06.
purpose.35  Although the first two questions are critical to a final
resolution of the problem of registration, this Article focuses primarily
on the last, or methodological, question.
1I. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND A NETWORK APPROACH
In the past, the determination of an organization's major purpose
has been made by looking at the group in isolation and assessing the
relative importance of its various activities. That this method may not
accurately identify an organization's primary mission is one inference
that can be drawn from the empirical investigation of politically active
exempt organizations published in 2006 by Stephen Weissman and Kara
Ryan. The authors examined "12 major nonprofit interest groups that
were heavily involved in influencing federal elections . .. ([from] 2000
through 2004).,36 Half of the groups studied were Republican in
orientation and half were oriented toward the Democratic party. The
groups investigated spanned a wide range of interests (business, labor,
issues, and party support), and they organized under §§ 501(c)(4)-
501(c)(6) of the Code or as registered or unregistered 527s. 37  The
authors found that all but two of the twelve entities studied had at least
38
one affiliated organization that was commonly managed. Most of the
501(c)(4)s, (5)s, and (6)s were affiliated with an unregistered 527, a
35. On one level, the ambiguity surrounding the scope of the relevant election-
related activity is irrelevant for the question examined in this paper. On another
level, the broader the definition of the relevant electoral activity, the more far-
reaching would be the impact of the network approach.
36. Weissman & Ryan, supra note 13, at 2 (alteration added).
37. Id. at 2-5. The authors selected groups that were in existence for more than
one election cycle. Thus, they did not study groups like Americans Coming
Together (ACT) or Swift Boat Veterans, since such groups were established for the
2004 presidential election and were "no longer active" after that. Id. at 2. In this
sentence and the rest of the Article, the phrase "unregistered 527" refers to a 527
group that has not registered with the FEC. Such a group would, however, have to
register with the IRS and be subject to the reporting and disclosure rules provided for
in § 527 and the accompanying regulations.
38. Id. at 5. The groups studied that had no commonly managed affiliates
were Progress for America, a 527 group that did not register with the FEC as a
political committee, and Americans for Job Security, a §501(c)(6) organization.
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registered 527, or both.39 Six instances involved a pair of 527 groups,
one of which was registered with the FEC and one of which was not.
Several of the 501(c) organizations were active in federal elections using
their general funds, rather than, or in addition to, working through an
associated PAC, because IRS rules permit such organizations to engage
in a significant amount of electioneering in their own right (although
they may be subject to tax on the amounts thus spent).4 °
Based upon an analysis of their findings, Weissman and Ryan
conclude that the current debate about the proper treatment of 527 groups
and other advocacy nonprofits is inadequate because it "has failed to
incorporate a real world understanding of the specific ways in which
various nonprofit interest groups-and their large donors-engage in
elections and relate to campaigns. They argue that an accurate
assessment of the role of such groups in elections "must take into
account all of an interest group's cumulative and coordinated election
activities, 4 2 which would include the activities of the other members of
the network, rather than looking at individual members in the network in
isolation.43
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 6. Section 527(f) of the Code provides that 501(c) groups that
engage in 527-type election activities using their own funds, without creating a 527
organization to pursue those activities, must pay a tax on the amount they spend on
such activities or on their net investment income, whichever is less. One
consequence of this formula is that a 501(c) group can engage in 527-type activities
without using a 527 organization, yet without the risk of taxation, if it has little or no
net investment income. For example, unions tend to have endowments generating
considerable net investment income; however, organizations that spend virtually all
their annual revenues each year tend not to have much, if any, net investment income
and thus could engage in political activity without any tax exposure under the "lesser
of' formula. There would still be some limits on the amount of political activity
such organizations could undertake because groups exempt under § 501(a) of the
Code must be primarily engaged in their exempt purpose, and political activity is not
an exempt purpose for § 501(c) groups.
41. Id. at 3; see also id. at 31.
42. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
43. Weissman and Ryan reach these conclusions about the nature of the
activities of groups that operate as part of a network. They do not, however, take a




Although Weissman and Ryan make no recommendations for
reforming the regulation of campaign finance, their findings suggest the
need to reconsider the manner in which campaign finance law should be
applied to groups operating as part of a network. In particular, in light of
the pervasiveness of affiliated groups of nonprofits, it would seem
desirable to adopt a network approach in applying campaign finance
rules, especially when deciding which groups should register as political
committees under FECA. This result is dictated by the fact that the state
interest in imposing restrictions on political speech in FECA is to avoid
corruption or the appearance of corruption. Corruption is a broad
concept. It includes public officials granting special access and influence
to contributors as well as quid pro quo transactions, in which public
officials sponsor (or oppose) specific legislation or commit to some other
action in exchange for campaign contributions. 4  As Weissman and
Ryan observe, focusing on organizational networks is important because
the impact of individual entities (and their donors) on the perceptions of
candidates and parties is likely to be a function of the conduct of the
entire network rather than the conduct of the individual members.45 In
other words, networks matter for assessing the risk of corruption or its
appearance because candidates and office holders typically will view the
network as a unitary group, even if the members of the network are
independent legal entities and do not coordinate with one another.
Indeed, often the names of several members of a network of affiliated
groups share common elements, like "MoveOn.org Voter Fund,"
44. For the evolution of the constitutional jurisprudence relating to the concept
of corruption, see Galston, supra note 29, at 1229-35 and the sources cited. See also
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2678 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the "new" theory of corruption recognized in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), on the ground that it
was inconsistent with First National Bank v. Bellotti and Buckley v. Valeo).
45. See Weissman & Ryan, supra note 13, at 3. See also id. at 27 (noting that
the result, when a donor can contribute large sums of soft money while also
contributing hard money to a range of candidates, is to create the appearance of a
"unified strategy" on the part of the donor). Despite this result, Weissman and Ryan
claim that, as a policy matter, it is still possible to "maintain that the benefits brought
to our democratic conversation by nonprofit advocacy and civic engagement
outweigh the costs of potential big donor influence over its outcome and elected
officials." Id. at 31.
20071
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
"MoveOn.org Civic Action," and "MoveOn.org Political Action."
46
They may be located at the same address or share offices or a website.
Most importantly, the member groups are commonly managed and share
some or all of their staff. As a consequence, members of a network of
organizations will be acting in concert or appear to be acting in concert
in the eyes of candidates for office and the public at large. In such
situations, an office holder's sense of gratitude is likely to be prompted
by the aggregate influence of the members of a network rather than
compartmentalized to reflect formal indicia of corporate boundaries
buried deep in some filing office in a state capital.
Thus, if each member of a network is examined separately to
determine if it should register with the FEC as a political committee and
be subject to FECA's source, amount, and disclosure rules, the result will
be as follows. The member of the network that is registered as a political
committee will engage in activities that explicitly urge or work toward
the election or defeat of a specific candidate. Because it is a registered
political committee, its ability to raise money will be constrained by
FECA's rules that cap the amount it can receive from individuals and
groups as well as by the rules preventing it from accepting money from
corporations and unions (other than from their PACs, which raise money
subject to the same limitations). Another member of the network may
not be registered as a political committee and, thus, it will be able to
accept unlimited amounts of money from individuals, corporations, and
unions (the latter two groups using their general treasury funds rather
than the less abundant money they have in their PACs). If the registered
member raises $N, the unregistered member may raise another $N, $3N,
or more because it is not constrained by the source and amount rules.47
46. See, e.g., http://www.moveon.org/about.html (web page for the "MoveOn
Family of Organizations") (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). MoveOn.org Voter Fund, an
unregistered 527 group, is no longer in existence. See MUR 5754, supra note 10.
MoveOn.org Civic Action is a section 501(c)(4) organization. MoveOn.org Political
Action is a 527 group registered with the FEC.
47. See Weissman & Ryan, supra note 13, at 9-10. In the 2004 presidential
cycle, for example, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) spent roughly
$12.5 million from its registered PAC and $46.7 million from its unregistered 527
group. Id. The Sierra Club spent $882,525 from its registered PAC and $6.26
million from its unregistered 527 group. Id. The Club for Growth spent $1.9
million from its registered PAC and $9.6 million from its unregistered 527 group.
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Thus, the amount that a candidate receives from the overtly political,
registered member is magnified by the additional sums spent by the
unregistered member, and a candidate or the public is likely to perceive
that the aggregate amount was spent by a single organization on the
candidate's behalf. The influence the network can have on the candidate
is commensurately increased, as is the potential for corruption or the
appearance of corruption. Add to this the fact that the unregistered
member can engage in numerous activities that are likely to be perceived
as unambiguously attempting to influence a campaign for federal office
48by anyone not trained in the Byzantine complexities of FECA, and a
candidate would be reasonable in assuming that either member of the
network was devoting all the network's resources to electing the
candidate or defeating his or her opponent.
If we believe that the law should regulate the world as it really is,
it follows that the real world flow of money and influence should be an
important datum for designing campaign finance regulation from both a
legal and a policy perspective. Thus, a network approach should provide
an attractive model for lawmakers involved in campaign finance reform
to consider when drafting rules for determining when an organization
should be classified as a political committee and required to observe the
reporting, source, and amount rules of FECA.
III. TAXA TION WITH REPRESENTA TION OF WASHINGTON AND
THE ALTERNATE CHANNEL DOCTRINE
Nonetheless, there exists a potential constitutional barrier to the
network approach that derives from a 1983 Supreme Court case, Regan
v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR). 49 The decision
centered on a challenge to the provision in the Internal Revenue Code
Id. MoveOn.Org spent $30 million from its registered PAC and $21 million from its
unregistered 527 group. Id.
48. For example, according to the FEC, in general, expenditures for messages
that support or oppose a candidate for federal office are not considered the type of
campaign expenditures that are counted to determine if an entity is a political
committee unless the messages expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified federal candidate. See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5604.
49. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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that prohibits § 501(c)(3) organizations from engaging in substantial
amounts of lobbying.50  The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that
the lobbying restriction unconstitutionally conditioned their entitlement
to charitable tax status on surrendering a considerable portion of their
ability to engage in speech protected by the First Amendment.
5
'
In upholding the tax law's limitation on the amount of
permissible lobbying, the Court first likened the tax exemption to a
government subsidy12 and then noted that Congress was under no
obligation to subsidize even constitutionally protected speech. Because
the plaintiff in TWR was a § 501(c)(3) organization, it received two tax
benefits: exemption from income taxation at the entity level and the
ability to raise money from contributions favored by the charitable
contribution deduction. 53 The Court observed that TWR was free to
establish a sister exempt organization, which would be unable to receive
deductible contributions, that could lobby on behalf of TWR, as long as
the second organization did not receive any funds from TWR.54 This
bifurcated arrangement would secure Congress's goal of preventing sums
raised through deductible contributions being used to fund substantial
lobbying, while providing TWR with an ample alternative channel for
lobbying to promote its mission.
The alternate channel option was critical to upholding the
lobbying limitation in the Code, according to Justice Blackmun, who
50. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1 (b)(3)(i), -1 (c)(3)(ii), (iv) (2007).
51. TWR, 461 U.S. at 542.
52. Id. at 544 ("A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to
the organization of the amount of tax that it would have to pay on its income."). The
Court did not, however, fully equate exemptions with subsidies, noting that they are
not in all respects identical. Id. at 544, n.5 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674-76 (1970)).
53. See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2000). Strictly speaking, the charitable contribution
deduction is a subsidy to the donor, whose taxable income is reduced. The Court
and most commentators, however, view the donor's subsidy as a tax benefit to the
recipient organization as well since it makes it easier for the organization to raise
money.
54. In fact, an uncontested fact in the case was that TWR had originally
operated through a § 501(c)(3) organization and an affiliated § 501(c)(4) group, and
that the latter had engaged in most of the lobbying related to the goals of both
organizations. See TWR, 461 U.S. at 543.
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wrote the concurrence. Although the decision for the Court also
mentioned the option, it did not appear to have the same centrality for the
decision as it did for the concurrence. Blackmun agreed with the
majority that "merely [refusing] to pay for the lobbying out of public
moneys" does not implicate the First Amendment. 55 However, he also
believed that it would violate the First Amendment to deprive the
organization of its right to petition government. The alternative channel
option enabled TWR, and thus Blackmun, to reconcile the law's
competing objectives. Further, because of his insistence on the
organization's constitutional right to lobby to make its views known to
lawmakers, Blackmun emphasized that TWR must be permitted not only
to establish but also to control its 501(c)(4) affiliate.56
Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these
organizations exercise over the lobbying of their §
501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems
would be insurmountable. It hardly answers one
person's objection to a restriction on his speech
that another person, outside his control, may speak
for him. Similarly, an attempt to prevent §
501(c)(4) organizations from lobbying explicitly on
behalf of their § 501(c)(3) affiliates would
perpetuate § 501(c)(3) organizations' inability to
make known their views on legislation without
incurring the unconstitutional penalty. Such
restrictions would extend far beyond Congress'[s]
mere refusal to subsidize lobbying.
57
For Blackmun, then, the existence of an alternate channel for speech was
absolutely necessary to prevent an "insurmountable" constitutional
defect. 58
TWR was a unanimous decision and, thus, the Supreme Court
did not need Blackmun's concurrrence to uphold the constitutionality of
the lobbying limitation. As a result, if the decision is viewed in isolation,
55. TWR, 461 U.S. at 545 (majority opinion) (alteration added); see id at 551-
52 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 552-53 (alteration added).
57. Id. at 553.
58. Id.
2007]
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it is possible that the alternative channel doctrine might not be seen as an
integral part of the decision's reasoning in the eyes of the six justices
who joined the opinion but not the concurrence. In other words, based
upon TWR alone, it is not obvious that the alternative channel doctrine
had precedential value as a component of the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. However, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and
lower courts suggest the opposite. In FCC v. League of Women Voters,
59
decided the year after TWR, the majority decision of the Court cited
TWR's alternative channel doctrine when it struck down the portion of a
federal statute for funding public broadcasting that prohibited recipients
of federal funds from engaging in "editorializing" during an election.
60
The law at issue would have denied public funds to public broadcasting
stations that engaged in such editorializing even if they segregated their
funds and paid for the editorials with nonfederal funds.61 The Court
invalidated the funding restriction, reasoning in part that the provision
denied the stations the alternative channel for speech that made the
62lobbying restriction in TWR constitutional. Similarly, in Rust v.
63Sullivan, decided in 1991, the Court cited TWR's alternative channel
doctrine 64 in upholding certain restrictions on the use of Title X family
planning funds. In League of Women Voters, the Court cited both the
main TWR opinion and the concurrence for the alternative channel
65doctrine. In Rust, the Court cited the main TWR opinion rather than the
concurrence for the doctrine, 66 thereby making clear its view that the
doctrine was essential to the TWR majority as well as to the concurrence.
Similarly, several district courts and courts of appeal have also treated
59. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
60. Id. at 399-400.
61. Id. at 400.
62. Id. at 400-01.
63. 500U.S. 173 (1991).
64. Id. at 197-98.
65. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-400.
66. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197-98 (reiterating the doctrine that the government does
not violate First Amendment rights by failing to fund certain types of speech as long
as an alternative means exists to engage in such speech without tax favored funds).
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the alternative channel doctrine as integral to the decision reached in
TWR.
67
The alternative channel doctrine, as developed in this line of
cases, raises questions for the tenability of a network approach in the
area of campaign finance regulation. To see this clearly, consider a
hypothetical 527 group that is established independently of any candidate
and that is devoted to election-related activities that are not the type to
trigger FECA registration. For example, on the expenditure side, the
hypothetical organization does not engage in or fund express advocacy in
support of or in opposition to one or more federal candidates; on the
contribution side, it neither gives money to any federal candidate nor
solicits funds by promising to support or oppose particular federal
candidates for public office.68 If that organization is viewed in isolation
to determine its major purpose, the FEC would examine the group's
organizing documents, its public statements about its mission, statements
made to potential contributors when soliciting funds, internal memoranda
and other documents, as well as the character of the activities the group
engages in and expenditures it makes in connection with campaigns.69
Now, suppose that the organization is also affiliated with a PAC
registered with the FEC, e.g., that the two groups share offices, a
website, some or all of their personnel, and some part of their names.
They may hold joint fundraising events, although they will be careful to
67. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(rejecting the plaintiffs "no alternative channel" argument on the ground that the
plaintiff could set up a PAC to engage in campaign speech using the intermediary of
a 501(c)(4) organization). As part of reaching its conclusion, the court observed that
Blackmun's view in TWR was "subsequently confirmed" by the Supreme Court in
League of Women Voters as "an accurate description of its holding." Id. (citing
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400); see also Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l,
Inc. v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 259 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (referring to both the main opinion and the concurrence for the proposition
that the existence of a § 501(c)(4) "safety valve" was necessary to avoid
constitutional infirmity in TWR). The Alliance court also stated that when the
Supreme Court in Rust upheld the regulation, it explicitly cited as one consideration
the fact that grant recipients had an alternative channel for abortion-related
messages. See id. at 259.
68. For the standard assumed by this hypothetical, see FEC Notice 2007-3,
supra note 10, at 5604-5605; 11 C.F.R. § 100.57 (2007).
69. See FEC Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5601.
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route hard money contributions to the PAC and other contributions to the
unregistered 527 group. Under a network approach it would seem that, to
an as yet unspecified degree, the PAC's purposes, statements,
solicitations, internal documents, and activities would be taken into
account in assessing the unregistered 527 group's mission and major
purpose. A similar analysis could be applied to organizations described
in § 501(c) that are part of a network, if one or more members of the
network are engaged in FECA-type campaign activities.7 °
A network approach thus seems to require a 527 group or other
exempt organization seeking to stay clear of FECA registration to be
independent of other entities engaged in FECA-type electioneering
activities, not only in the sense of not coordinating its activities with such
entities, but also in the more comprehensive sense of not being part of a
network in which one or more members engage in such electioneering.
71
Arguably, then, a network approach seems to create a situation in which
the price of obtaining exemption under the Code is to deny certain
groups two opportunities: first, the opportunity to engage in FECA-type
electioneering through the alternative channel of a separate affiliated
entity that registers with the FEC and, second, the opportunity even to
affiliate with other entities that so engage.
Either way, as part of its laudable attempt to attain a more
realistic assessment of the real world characteristics of organizations
involved in elections, a network approach would appear to bump up
against the First Amendment alternate channel doctrine that both justifies
and circumscribes restrictions on certain types of political speech.
70. It is unclear, based upon TWR, whether a 501(c)(3) organization with a
501(c)(4) affiliate must be permitted even if the 501(c)(4) engages in electoral
politics or establishes a PAC for such purposes. The court in Branch Ministries
appeared to believe that such an affiliate is constitutionally required. Branch
Ministries, 211 F.3d at 143. However, the court erroneously thought that a 501(c)(4)
organization is not permitted to engage in political campaign activity unless it does
so through a PAC. See id. It is possible that this erroneous view influenced its
belief that a 501(c)(4) affiliate was constitutionally required.
71. A "network effect" would be possible even without coordination between
the group seeking to avoid registering with the FEC and other members of the
network, since Weissman and Ryan argue that cumulative activities of a network of
commonly managed groups should also be considered in a "real world" assessment
for campaign finance purposes. See Weissman and Ryan, supra note 13, at 3.
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IV. THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, CONTEXT, AND
ATTRIBUTION
As Part III suggests, a network approach appears to be in some
tension with the alternative channel doctrine of Taxation with
Representation of Washington. Recall that TWR involved the
relationship between a § 501(c)(3) and a § 501(c)(4) organization. The
501(c)(3) group was entitled to the tax benefit of exemption at the entity
level, and its contributors were entitled to deduct from their taxable
income an amount equal to some portion of their donations to the
501(c)(3) group. 2 The problem confronting the Supreme Court was to
find a way to enable the 501(c)(3) group to lobby certain public officials
more than an insubstantial amount without having tax deductible
contributions used to fund the group's lobbying. Section 501(c)(4)
groups also benefit from exemption from income tax at the entity level,
but they are permitted to lobby as much as is useful to achieve the
purpose(s) for which their exemption was granted.73 Since they cannot
receive tax-deductible donations, their lobbying activities are not paid for
by the deductible contribution subsidy. 74 Permitting a 501(c)(3) group to
use an affiliated entity or partner to engage in the 501(c)(3) group's
lobbying thus preserved that group's ability to lobby lawmakers without
quantitative restrictions while depriving such speech of funding raised
through tax deductible contributions.
A § 527 organization is a political organization that also realizes
certain tax benefits as a result of its exempt status under § 527 of the
Code.75 The exact nature of the tax benefits accruing to 527 groups is a
72. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2000).
73. See Rev. Rul. 71-530, 1971-2 C.B. 237 (holding that a 501(c)(4) social
welfare organization may have lobbying as its sole purpose).
74. Although exemption from income tax alone may provide organizations
described in any subsection of § 501(c) with a substantial tax benefit, the cases do
not discuss this benefit in terms of a subsidy. Similarly, the Tax Expenditure tables
produced yearly by the U.S. Department of Treasury list deductible contributions as
a tax expenditure, but do not list exemption under 501(a). See STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF . FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010 (Comm. Print 2006), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-06.pdf.
75. I.R.C. § 527 (2000).
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matter of some debate. Some commentators have argued that the § 527
provision relieving such groups' "exempt function" income76 from
taxation confers no economic benefit because the law prior to the
enactment of § 527 did not tax such amounts in any event. 77 Current law,
however, makes clear that the conditions set forth in the statute and the
regulations must be satisfied for a 527 group to be entitled to exemption
from income of various types of revenue that will otherwise be subject to
tax.7' For example, if a 527 group commingles the funds it spends on the
influencing activities authorized by the statute with the funds it spends
on other activities, it risks losing the exemption for all the commingled
funds. This result suggests that Congress saw § 527 as affording certain
political groups a tax-preferred status that would not necessarily
otherwise exist. Further, most commentators agree that § 2501(a)(4),
which relieves donors to 527 groups from gift tax exposure for gifts in
excess of the annual gift tax exclusion, constitutes a benefit to the
organization as well as to the donors.79  It seems, therefore, that if a
network approach would cause an otherwise independent 527
organization80 to be denied the tax benefits of § 527 unless it either
registers as a political committee subject to FECA's source, amount, and
disclosure requirements or gives up the opportunity to partner with a
political committee subject to FECA, then the approach would deny the
organization the opportunities for political speech required by TWR,
Rust, and League of Women Voters. A similar argument could be made
76. Under I.R.C. § 527(c)(1) (2000), the organization's taxable income is
calculated by subtracting its exempt function income and its allowable deductions
from its gross income. "Exempt function income" is the organization's income from
contributions, member dues, fundraising, or bingo games insofar as it is segregated
for using to influence, or attempting to influence, "the selection, nomination,
election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public
office...." See I.R.C. § 527(c)(3), (e)(2) (2000).
77. See Roger Colinvaux, Regulation of Political Organizations and the Red
Herring of Tax Exempt Status, 59 NAT'L TAX J 531, 535-37 (2006); Gregg D. Polsky
& Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1000, 1015-16 (2005). The groups are taxed on interest and divided income as
well as on capital appreciation. See I.R.C. §§ 527(b)(2), (c).
78. See I.R.C. § 527 (2000).
79. See Colinvaux, supra note 77, at 538-39.
80. The hypothetical posits a 527 group not coordinating with a candidate,
party, or a committee of either.
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in connection with exempt organizations described in § 501(c), if they
risked losing their status because they maintained a close relationship
with a political committee subject to FECA.
A second obstacle to applying a network approach is the fact that
the legislative history of § 527 of the Code specifically provides that, if a
501(c) organization establishes an affiliated 527 group, the activities of
the 527 group will not be attributable to the 501(c) organization. 81 After
making clear Congress's "expectation" that eligible 501(c) organizations
would establish the separate entities authorized by § 527 to fund any
campaign-related activities the organizations intended to sponsor, rather
than continue to engage in such activities as part of their own
82
operations, the legislative history states that, if a § 501(c) organization
establishes and maintains a 527 political organization, the latter will be
"treated as an entity which is separate from the exempt organization
maintaining the fund."' 83 As a consequence, amounts funneled through
the exempt organization to the 527 organization will not be treated as
having been spent by the exempt organization or as taxable to it as long
as the exempt organization transfers the money to the 527 group
84promptly. By the same token, even though tax law caps the amount of
campaign activities that a 501(c) group can engage in as a condition of
retaining its exempt status, a 501(c) group permitted to establish a 527
organization will not put its exemption at risk no matter how much
81. Section 501(c)(3) groups, however, are not permitted to set up 527 political
organizations. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
82. See S. REP. No. 93-1357, at 30 (1974) (observing that taking "the
campaign-type activities ... entirely out of the section 50 1(c) organization[ ] [would
be] to the benefit both of the organization and the administration of the tax laws")
(alterations added)).
83. Id.
84. Id. The exempt organization will, however, be treated as having spent the
money for political purposes if it earns interest on the funds while they are under its
control. Id.
85. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2003) (stating that a
501(c)(4) organization must be "primarily engaged in promoting in some way the
common good and general welfare of the people of the community"), § 1.501(c)(4)-
l(a)(2)(ii) (2003) (stating that "[t]he promotion of social welfare does not include
direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or
in opposition to any candidate for public office[,]" among other things (alterations
added)).
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campaign activity the affiliated 527 group engages in. In contrast, if
exempt organizations engage in campaign activities as part of their own
operations, rather than segregating them in an affiliated 527 group, they
have to pay a tax based upon the amounts spent on such activities or
86upon their net investment income, whichever is less.
The preceding legislative history thus makes clear that Congress
did not intend the activities of a 527 group connected to a 501(c)
organization to be attributed to the latter for purposes of determining
whether the 501(c) organization is entitled to its exempt status.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that Congress's reason for characterizing
the relation between the two types of organization was a general belief
that the activities of separately organized entities cannot be attributed to
one another. That Congress did not hold such a belief is evidenced by
the fact that it explicitly prohibited § 501(c)(3) organizations from
87establishing a related 527 group. Instead, it limited the establishment
88
of 527 groups to 501(c) organizations that are themselves permitted to
engage in campaign activities, i.e., to several exempt groups described in
section 501(c) other than subsection 501(c)(3). 89 We can only speculate
as to the reason why Congress did not authorize 501(c)(3) organizations
to set up affiliated 527 groups on the condition that funds from the
former would not be transferred to or used to maintain the latter. Since a
structure of this kind would have prevented money attributable to
deductible charitable contributions from being used to support 527
groups, Congress's failure to allow 501(c) organizations this option
reveals that it must have been concerned with more than protecting the
86. I.R.C. § 527(0(1) (2000).
87. See S. REP. No. 93-1357, supra note 82, at 30. This is the case when the
purpose would be to promote or oppose the election of a candidate to elected office.
They are, however, permitted to establish a 527 organization to raise and spend
money in connection with non-elective offices, e.g., to influence the selection of a
judicial nomination.
88. Of course, not all 527 groups are connected to another entity. Section 527
also contemplates the existence of freestanding 527 groups.
89. See S. REP. No. 93-1357, supra note 82, at 30. The most common 501(c)
organizations that establish a connected 527 group, and the ones mentioned in the
Senate Report, are those described in sections 501(c)(4)-501(c)(6), i.e., social
welfare groups, labor organizations, trade associations, and chambers of commerce.
Id.
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public fisc. Based upon the legislative history of § 527, it seems likely
that the exclusion for 501(c)(3) groups derives from the underlying
policy objective to keep charities themselves, and not just charities'
money, out of political campaigns. Since 501(c)(3) groups are not
permitted, much less encouraged, to engage in campaign activities even
minimally, 90 Congress did not authorize them to create affiliated, albeit
separate, 527 groups, as other 501(c) entities can do. That Congress
prevented 501(c)(3) organizations from having a connected 527 group
thus suggests that in its view, the activities of a connected 527 group
would somehow be attributable to the charity and thus violate the
prohibition against 501(c)(3) groups intervening in political campaigns.
This would be the case even though the two organizations would have
been legally distinct and financially separate.
91
The preceding analysis suggests that the separate legal entity
paradigm that explained and justified the holding in Taxation with
Representation of Washington cannot automatically be generalized to
affiliated entities one of which is engaged in political campaigns. To
avoid attributing a significant inconsistency to Congress based upon its
encouraging some 501(c) groups to establish 527 organizations while
prohibiting this to 501(c)(3) organizations, it is necessary to reject an
otherwise plausible assumption that Congress enabled some 501(c)
groups to create § 527 affiliates because it believed that their separate
legal existence precluded attributing the activities of one affiliated group
to another. It appears more likely that Congress was motivated by
consistent policy objectives, namely, (1) facilitating the ability of exempt
organizations already permitted to participate in campaigns to do so
without threatening their exempt status, (2) encouraging such groups to
take the campaign activity "entirely out" of their own operations by
creating a tax-favored campaign vehicle in which to segregate the
90. The prohibition against political campaign activity by 501(c)(3)
organizations is absolute. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
91. When it enacted § 527, Congress chose to allow the host 501(c)
organization to pay for the cost of setting up and administering the 527 group,
although the 501(c) organization is not itself permitted to contribute to the 527
group. If Congress had wanted to permit 501(c)(3) organizations to set up 527
groups as long as no money or other property flowed from the former to the latter, it
could have provided that 501(c)(3) organization could set up 527 groups but not pay
the administrative costs of setting them up or maintaining them.
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campaign activity, and (3) reinforcing the policy against 501(c)(3)
organizations engaging in campaign activity either directly or
92indirectly.
The Internal Revenue Service enlarged the statutory framework
created by Congress when the Service explicitly blessed the existence of
organizational networks consisting of a § 501 (c)(3) charity affiliated with
an organization described in another subsection of 501(c) that has, in
turn, established an affiliated 527 political organization. For example, in
a training manual for its agents, the IRS asserts that a 501(c)(3)
organization can create a 501(c)(4) organization which, in turn, can
create one or more 527 organizations without jeopardizing the
501(c)(3)'s charitable exemption as long as the groups "do not
commingle their finances or other resources, conduct separate activities
in furtherance of their exempt purposes, and maintain and respect their
separate entities. 93  Further, the IRS training manual blesses such
networks of affiliated organizations even when all members of a network
have a distinctive name in common.94
The IRS position arguably allows 501(c)(3) organizations to
circumvent Congress's ban on 501(c)(3) organizations establishing 527
92. See S. REP. No. 93-1357, supra note 82, at 30.
93. Judith E. Kindell & John F. Reilly, Election Year Issues, 335, 477-78
(2002), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/topici02.pdf (offering examples involving
state PACs and federal PACs). The 501(c)(3) organization cannot contribute any
funds to any of the PACs connected to its affiliated 501(c)(4) organization (Example
11), nor earmark any funds it provides to an affiliated organization for campaign
activity (Example 6). See id. at 479, 475-76. Although the IRS warns in the
introduction to the training manual that the doctrines and examples discussed there
cannot be relied upon by taxpayers in a court of law, this and other training manuals
are widely studied and relied upon as indicating the Service's understanding of the
issues discussed.
94. Id. at 479 (offering as a permissible network the Downtown Business
League (a 501(c)(6) organization), the Downtown Business League Education Fund
(a 501(c)(3) organization), and the Downtown Business League PAC (a 527
organization), at 477 (noting that a 501(c)(3) entity cannot contribute to a 527 group
even if the 527 group is part of a network of affiliated organizations that includes the
501(c)(3) entity). Cf id. at 475-76 (noting that a 501(c)(3) entity can pay
membership fees to a 501(c)(6) trade association that engages in political campaign
activity as long as the 501(c)(3) group does not earmark any of its contributions for
such activity). Given that money is fungible, the membership fees permitted a
501 (c)(3) organization would free other 501 (c)(6) funds to spend on campaigns.
95
groups. At the very least, its position seems to contravene the general
tax policy against permitting a taxpayer to avoid undesirable tax
consequences by creating a series of formally distinct transactions to
96
accomplish what is in substance an integrated transaction. It may be
this tax policy, in whole or in part, that led Congress to deny 501(c)(3)
organizations the ability to establish their own 527 affiliates. In contrast,
the Service's position permitting 501(c)(3)-501(c)(4)-527 organization
networks appears to derive from its longstanding policy of respecting
corporate or entity boundaries. 97 In the exempt area, this policy appears
prominently when the IRS considers whether the operations of an exempt
organization's taxable subsidiary or subsidiaries should affect the
organization's own exempt status or its liability for tax on unrelated
business income.98 Both the Service and the courts suspend this policy if
separate entities are created to avoid taxes, for example, to shift income,
if they disregard the entity boundaries themselves, or if one entity serves
solely as the agent or instrumentality of the other.
99
The test used to determine if organizations' boundaries should be
respected when for-profit entities are involved is often characterized in
terms of business purpose or economic reality.100 The criteria employed
95. See Chris Kemmit, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal
Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145,
161 (2006) (describing how churches have formed related 501(c)(4) organizations
with PACs to conduct campaign activities). See supra note 70.
96. See Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1427-28 (1987) (stating "the
fundamental principle of tax law that the substance of a transaction, and not its form,
controls its tax consequences").
97. This policy is based upon Moline Prop., Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436
(1943) (holding that income of a corporation could not be passed through to the sole
stockholder for income tax purposes because it belonged to the corporation as a tax
entity).
98. See Evelyn Brody, Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal
Boundary Problems, in NONPROFITS AND BuSINESS (C. Eugene Steuerle and Joseph
Cordes, eds. forthcoming 2008); Francis R. Hill and Douglas M. Mancino,
TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 27-6 to 27-10 (2002).
99. See Moline Prop., 319 U.S. at 440; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-02-046 (Oct.
18, 2004); and infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
100. See Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1135,
1151-52 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that a parent corporation could deduct premiums
paid to its wholly owned subsidiary insurance company because the latter had a valid
business existence, its business operations were separate from those of the parent,
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in determining whether entity boundaries will be respected in
circumstances involving nonprofits seem to be less clear cut. For
example, entity boundaries may be disregarded where one entity is an
"integral part" of the operations of another. In such situations, an entity
that does not qualify as exempt in its own right is typically seeking to
gain exempt status by virtue of its relationship with an organization that
is exempt.101 Qualitative considerations enter into this determination,
seemingly to a greater extent than with for-profits. Entity boundaries
have also been disregarded between nonprofits if two or more entities
share directors, officers, employees, facilities, or services, but only if one
or more of the entities exercises significant control over the daily
operations of one or more of the others in addition to these common
features. 02
In a Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM) issued in 1999, the
IRS stated its belief that, in addition to considering the operations
conducted by an exempt entity, 10 3 "it is also important to review
preceding and contemporaneous activities and motivations of related
organizations and individuals" in order to determine an entity's exempt
status. 10 4 The organization under review in the TAM was the Progress
and Freedom Foundation, a group created to develop, market, and
distribute materials for college courses taught by Newt Gingrich (then a
member of the House of Representatives), publish newsletters and books,
and hold conferences.
10 5
and it insured a significant amount of risk for unrelated parties). Cf Humana Inc. v.
Comm'r, 881 F.2d 247, 254-55 (6th Cir. 1989) (contrasting the business purpose and
economic reality doctrines).
101. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 394 (1993), aff'd, 30
F.3d 494 (3rd Cir. 1994); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,830 (Aug. 30, 1990); Rev.
Rul. 75-282, 1975-2 C. B. 201; Rev. Rul. 68-26, 1968-1 C. B. 272; Hill and
Mancino, supra note 98, 27.04.
102. See Hill and Mancino, supra note 98, 27.03.
103. Or an entity applying for exemption.
104. Unreleased IRS Technical Advice Memorandum issued to the Progress
and Freedom Foundation, Facts, Part II, in 23 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 512, 520
(1999) (hereafter the "PFF TAM"). This TAM was also published by Tax Analysts,
Tax Notes Today (Feb. 5, 1999), Doc 1999-5081 (1999 TNT 24-25).
105. These and other educational activities of PFF are summarized in the PFF
TAM, id at 519-20.
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Among other issues, the Service examined whether the Progress
and Freedom Foundation had provided a substantial private benefit to
individuals or to other organizations, such as the Republican Party,
which would have disqualified it for exemption as a 501(c)(3)
organization.1°6 Understanding the Foundation's "context" was critical to
this inquiry, according to the IRS, and a significant portion of the
seventy-three page ruling was devoted to the contextual inquiry.'0 7 The
Service based its contextual approach on the mode of analysis employed
by the Tax Court in American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner,
08
which it cited.10 9 However, in contrast to the Tax Court, the IRS stated
in the TAM that it would look to an organization's "association with
outside entities only where there is already evidence of private benefit in
the activities of the organization at issue." "
0
It is unclear how these precedents would be applied to networks
of exempt organizations, some or all of which are engaged in campaign
activity. As was discussed earlier, in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington the Supreme Court reduced the relevant
tax law inquiries when a 501(c)(3) organization establishes a 501(c)(4)
entity to lobby on its behalf to determining whether the two entities have
completely segregated their finances and maintain records to verify this
arrangement." Based on the Court's reasoning in TWR, it seems that the
presence of common directors or staff, shared facilities, or similar
organizational names are not relevant to the question of respecting entity
boundaries.
How can the approach adopted in TWR be reconciled with the
approach taken by the Progress and Freedom Foundation TAM? TWR
106. See id. at 530-34 (discussing whether the Gingrich courses improperly
benefited the Republican Party and concluding that they did not).
107. See id at 520-25, 533-534.
108. 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
109. See PFF TAM, supra note 104, at 533 (contrasting the contextual
approach of American Campaign Academy with the approach of other decisions). In
American Campaign Academy, the Tax Court examined the exempt entity's
relationship with the Republican Party, its committees and agents, and Republican
candidates and officeholders in addition to examining the educational programs that
it conducted. See 92 T.C. at 1070-73.
110. PFF TAM, supra note 104, at 533.
111. 461 U.S. 540, 544, n.6 (1983).
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involved lobbying, not campaign activity, and the relationship analyzed
was between organizations described in § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4)."'
The Progress and Freedom Foundation TAM examined the exempt status
of a 501(c)(3) entity with ties to a § 527 political organization. In the
TAM, the Service inquired into the programs, founders, directors, and
sources of funding of the two entities.'1 13 The difference between the two
approaches may be that the concern in TWR was exclusively the need to
prevent money raised through contributions entitled to the charitable
deduction from being used for lobbying, whereas the concern in the
TAM was whether the exempt entity was operated in substantial part for
private benefit. In other words, the issue in the TAM was the threshold
question of the character of the organization's mission.
Private benefit may sometimes occur through financial
enrichment, as is the case when an exempt organization enters into a
contract and the primary purpose is to profit the other party to the
contract rather than to facilitate the mission that qualified the
organization for exemption in the first place.1 14  Private benefit also
occurs when an exempt organization operates, in whole or in part, to
further the purposes of a third party, whether an individual or a group.
For example, in the American Campaign Academy case, the school in
question trained young adults to become political "campaign
professionals." The Tax Court found that because of the partisan nature
of the admissions process and some of the courses, the fact that the
school was exclusively financed by sources associated with the
Republican Party, and the circumstance that most, if not all, of the
112. In TWR the plaintiff was a 501(c)(3) group that had assumed the lobbying
activities of its former 501(c)(4) affiliate, so there was a single organization in
existence at the time of trial. The relationship between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4)
organizations was raised by the Court as part of its determination that the 501(c)(3)
group would not be harmed by its holding, since it could establish an affiliated
501(c)(4) group to perform a substantial amount of lobbying on its behalf.
113. See PFF TAM, supra note 104, at 519, 522-23, 526-28, 533-34.
114. Not all private benefit disqualifies an exempt organization, even a charity.
For example, educational institutions provide a substantial private benefit to
individual students (even if society also benefits from an educated citizenry
indirectly). However, in most cases the students will be considered to form a
charitable class and, thus, the benefit they receive is not in conflict with the idea of
charitable exemption.
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graduates went to work for Republican officeholders or committees, the
school conferred a substantial private benefit on the Republican Party,
even though a large part of the curriculum was nonpartisan and
academically rigorous in nature.1" 5 Since Republican Party sources
supplied most of the school's operating budget, the Party did not benefit
financially from the school directly or in the short run. Yet it clearly
benefited by the- increased pool of knowledgeable Republican-oriented
campaign professionals. As a result, the school's mission was hybrid in
nature-partly educational and partly partisan-and the partisan element
disqualified it for 501(c)(3) exempt status.
The Progress and Freedom TAM and the American Campaign
Academy decision thus provide a legal basis for distinguishing Taxation
with Representation of Washington. The former two rulings focus on the
nature of an exempt organization's mission, and for that inquiry it may
be appropriate to inquire into an exempt entity's relationships with
external parties, whether individuals or groups, as part of the process of
determining the purpose for which the entity exists and operates. Such
an inquiry should not undermine First Amendment values, whether of
speech or association, because an organization is not entitled to exempt
status in the first place unless it operates primarily for the purpose that
supports the exemption. In the American Campaign Academy case, the
court concluded that the context in which the school operated
undermined its claim to exemption as a 501(c)(3) educational
organization. In the Progress and Freedom Foundation TAM, in
contrast, the result of the Service's lengthy investigation into the context
in which the Foundation was created and operated resulted in upholding
the organization's claim to exempt status.
These findings support the legitimacy of looking at an exempt
organization's context as well as its purpose. That conclusion validates a
network approach for certain purposes of tax law and possibly other legal
regimes in which speech is restricted to achieve a state interest. The First
Amendment cases' 16 emphasizing the importance of an alternative
115. See American Campaign Academy v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1059,
1069-73 (1989).
116. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (challenging the manner in
which the Department of Health and Human Services enforced a law for the funding
of family planning services); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364
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channel for expression are not apposite because they revolve around the
source and use of government funds by entities whose purpose or
mission is not under review. When the issue is the use (or abuse) of
government funding, segregation of accounts rather than the
independence of entities is adequate to address the problem. It remains
to examine how First Amendment doctrines developed specifically in the
context of campaign finance jurisprudence would affect the speech issues
raised if a network approach were used to classify organizations as
political committees for federal election purposes.
V. THE PLACE OF CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS IN FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
The alternate channel doctrine is a constitutional doctrine that
assumes the propriety, indeed the necessity, of taking into account the
context in which an organization operates when determining whether its
First Amendment rights have been violated by regulations restricting its
political speech in order to preserve the integrity of public funds.
Recourse to context has also played a role in various situations that are
regulated by campaign finance law. Because campaign finance
regulations impact speech at the heart of democratic processes, a high
burden of justification is usually imposed upon state actors who would
impose restrictions on political speech. 117
The FEC examines the context in which organizations operate in
numerous circumstances. For example, FECA limits the dollar amounts
that can be contributed by individuals or groups to candidates or political
• 118
committees. These limitations could be easily evaded by one
organization creating numerous separately organized entities if each
entity was entitled to the statutory maximum and the related entities
could then operate in a coordinated manner. To prevent such an outcome,
FECA requires that the FEC analyze the relationship between two or
more organizations to determine whether they should be counted as a
(1984) (challenging the manner of the Federal Communications Commission's
enforcement of a telecommunications statute).
117. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976).
118. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2000).
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single organization for purposes of contribution limits.'19 In such
instances, the FEC does not limit itself to determining formal relations
between and among entities, i.e., whether one of the entities is a parent or
sister of another as a matter of corporate law, or whether one has the
power to direct the affairs of the other through provisions of bylaws or
contracts. 12  Rather, it also examines relations of influence among the
entities based upon informal practices, whether the entities share
personnel, whether they have overlapping memberships, or even whether
the employees of one organization were formerly associated with the
other. 12 The FEC also takes into consideration whether one of the
entities "had an active or significant role" in creating the related entity
and whether related entities have "similar patterns of contributions or
contributors," suggestive of an informal "ongoing relationship" among
them. 122 Further, when independent entities themselves seek to be
classified as affiliated with one another so that they can both raise funds
from their respective memberships for a single PAC, the FEC undertakes
123a similar context-oriented analysis.
In a recently published Notice, the FEC addressed directly which
constellation of facts, taken together, will result in an entity organized
under § 527 being classified as a political committee and made subject to
FECA's disclosure, source, and amount rules. 12 4 The FEC published the
Notice in response to a directive by the Federal District Court of the
District of Columbia requiring the agency either to promulgate a rule
clarifying the conditions that trigger classification as a political
committee or to explain its reasons for not doing so.125 The Notice
119. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (2000); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(g), 110.3 (2007).
120. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(g)(2), (3), (4)(ii)(B), (C) (2007).
121. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(g)(4)(ii)(B), (E), (F), 110.3(a)(3)(ii)(B), (E), (F)
(2007).
122. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(g)(4)(ii)(I), (J), 110.3(a)(3)(ii)(I), (J) (2007).
123. See FEC Advisory Op. 2002-15, Feb. 19, 2003, available at http:Ilsaos.
nictusa.com/saos/searchao?SUBMIT=continue.
124. See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5596.
125. See Shays v. FEC, 424 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2006) ("Shays IF'). The
FEC had taken the position that its regulations together with rules promulgated in
2004 addressed the issue adequately, especially since it had concluded that political
committee status was best determined on a case-by-case basis. See id at 112-13;
Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5596. However, the court found that the agency had
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makes clear that the FEC will look to all the facts and circumstances
surrounding a group's activities to determine if its major purpose is to
influence federal elections, and the Notice elaborates the type of
contextual inquiries that will influence the FEC's assessment. For
example, the agency will look at the representations that a group makes,
orally or in writing, when it solicits funds and how the group
characterizes itself and its projects on its website and in internal
memoranda rather than limit itself to a review of the group's
expenditures, organizing documents, and formal statements.1
26
Although the FEC's Notice 2007-3 does not mention the
existence of networks of organizations as a factor that will contribute to
its assessment of a group's classification as a political committee, the
conciliation agreements executed by the agency and certain 527 groups
in 2006 reveal that the agency does in fact take network relationships
into account. For example, in the conciliation agreement concluded with
the League of Conservation's two 527 groups, neither of which had
registered as a political committee, the FEC noted that the League's
associated 501(c)(4) organization (League of Conservation Voters, Inc.)
had raised funds for the two affiliated 527 groups. 127 The agreement also
recognized that the 501(c)(4) organization, the two 527 groups, and a
League of Conservation Voters PAC (registered with the FEC) jointly
failed to explain adequately its decision to proceed through adjudication rather than
through rule making and it deemed the agency's actions insufficient to put entities
on notice of the circumstances creating an obligation to register. See Shays II at 114,
116. Thus, the court remanded the case to the FEC "either to articulate its reasoning
for its decision to proceed by case-by-case adjudication or to promulgate a rule if
necessary." Id. at 103. FEC Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, was the agency's
response. See supra notes 5, 11.
126. See Notice 2007-3, supra note 10, at 5601-02, 5605.
127. See Conciliation Agreement in MUR 5753 (2006), at 7, available at
http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocs/00005905.pdf (noting that raising contributions in
excess of $10,000 was "[o]ne of the primary responsibilities of LCV Inc.")
(alteration added)). Nonetheless, the agency chose not to assert violations of FECA
by the 501(c)(4) organization. Id. at 12. That the FEC is willing, under the right
circumstances, to bring an enforcement action against a 501(c)(4) group that fails to
register as a political committee can be seen from its conciliation agreement with
Freedom Inc., a 501(c)(4) group. See Conciliation Agreement in MUR 5492 (2006),
available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocs/00005949.pdf
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funded the main project undertaken by the organizations together. 28 In
analyzing the major purpose of the League's 527 groups, the FEC cited
the electoral objectives of that project and treated the four "LCV
organizations" as engaged in a joint enterprise. 129 For the FEC, then, to
determine whether a 527 organization should be classified as a political
committee, it is necessary to view the organization's activities and
statements in context, and this inquiry may include considering whether
and how the organization interacts with affiliated organizations.
The FEC's contextual approach, as it was employed in
connection with a different provision of federal campaign finance law,
was recently challenged successfully in the Supreme Court. 130 The
plaintiff in the case was Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., a corporation
exempt under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code as an advocacy
organization.' 3' The plaintiff challenged the provision of federal
campaign finance law that prevents corporations from paying for
"electioneering communications" using their general treasury funds,
rather than the hard money in their PACs, insofar as that provision
required the organization to use hard money to pay for communications
that it believed constituted grass roots lobbying.132
Congress's purpose in enacting the electioneering
communication provisions was to end the common practice of unions
and corporations using soft money to pay for advertising that purported
to advocate for issues or legislation, but that was really intended to
128. See Conciliation Agreement in MJR 5753, supra note 128, at 8.
129. See id. at 8-9.
130. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2665. Electioneering communications, a category of campaign
speech introduced as part of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform, are
public communications that mention a candidate for federal office, are made on the
eve of a primary or general election, and are conveyed using broadcast or similar
media. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b(c) (2000). Communications utilizing
cable or satellite are also covered, and the provision is applicable during the sixty
days preceding a general election and thirty days preceding a primary. See 2 U.S.C.
§§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(II) (2000). The operative provisions of FECA require that
corporations and unions pay for such communications with hard money, rather than
their general treasury funds, and that any person or entity who makes or funds such
communications must comply with special reporting requirements when the sums
involved in a year exceed $10,000. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(2), 434(f) (2000).
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influence the election of one or more federal candidates and was likely to
have such an effect. The ads could claim to be something other than
endorsement of or opposition to a candidate for federal office because
they would refer to an issue or pending legislation and urge listeners or
viewers to contact a candidate and tell him or her the caller's opinion
about the issue or legislation. However, the issues chosen were
invariably defining issues in the election in the district targeted to receive
such ads, and the substantive discussion of the issue in the ads was
relatively modest. The ads were understood by most of those who heard
them as intended to mobilize voters in support of or in opposition to
particular federal candidates. Further, because ads of this type tended to
be taken off the air the day after an election, even if the issue referred to
was still unresolved or the legislation was still pending, the ads were
widely viewed as electioneering masquerading as issue advocacy so that
they could be financed with soft money.133
The content of the ads under discussion in Wisconsin Right to
Life was devoted to the subject of filibustering judicial nominations in
the Senate. 134 The ads disparaged senators who used filibusters as a
device to delay or prevent judicial nominations from being considered on
the floor of the Senate, and they urged listeners to contact their two
senators, who were named, and to communicate the listeners' opposition
to filibustering in the Senate. Based on the literal text, the ads did not
appear to involve campaigning for or against either of the state's
senators, only one of whom was up for reelection.1 35 The background of
the ads, in contrast, suggested strongly that the ads were intended to
attack Senator Feingold, who was seeking reelection and who had joined
in filibustering certain judicial nominations. 136 As a consequence, the
133. See the discussion in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126-29 (2003).
134. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2660-2661.
135. The ads did not mention the campaign or a political party, identify either
senator as a candidate (only Russell Feingold was up for re-election), or speak to a
candidate's qualifications for office. See id. at 2667.
136. See id. at 2667-69 (summarizing and rejecting the FEC's position), id., at
2697-99 (Souter, J., dissenting); Brief of Appellant Petitioner at 43-48, FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (No. 06-969). Cf Wisconsin Right
to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2684 n.8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the "purpose of
the ad was to put political pressure upon Senator Feingold to change his position on
the filibuster-not only through the constituents who accepted the invitation to
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Court's holding depended largely on whether it would look beyond the
four comers of the text of the ads to the larger context in which the ads
were produced and aired as part of the process of determining whether
they should be classified as discussion or advocacy of issues, on the one
hand, or electioneering with respect to candidates, on the other.
Both the plaintiff organization and the FEC agreed that the ads in
question conformed to the definition of "electioneering communications"
in FECA and, thus, that they must be paid for with hard money unless the
Court found the statutory provision unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of the case. 37 The FEC argued that the character of the ads could
not be evaluated without looking at the context in which they were
written and aired because the relevant legal standard included
determining whether the organizations intended to influence the federal
election with the ads and the ads were likely to have that effect."' The
Supreme Court disagreed. It ruled that to avoid unconstitutionally
burdening the speaker, the ads must be judged without reference to their
context, or with only a minimal reference to context. 139 So judged, the
Court concluded, the ads were neither express advocacy nor its
functional equivalent. 40  As a result, the Court concluded that the
contact him, but also through the very existence of an ad bringing to the public's
attention that he, Senator Feingold, stood athwart the allowance of a vote on judicial
nominees").
137. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2663. The Supreme Court had
upheld the electioneering provisions against a facial challenge four years earlier, in
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. at 189-94.
138. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2663-2664.
139. See id. at 2664-66. The Court allowed that courts "need not ignore basic
background information that may be necessary to put an ad in context-such as
whether an ad 'describes a legislative issue that is either currently the subject of
legislative scrutiny or likely to be the subject of such scrutiny in the near future."'
Id. at 2669. Thus, it seems that the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ads disputing
aspects of Senator John Kerry's Vietnam service would not qualify as issue ads
under the Court's definition, since they addressed the character and fitness for office
of a candidate rather than a legislative proposal under consideration or likely to be
considered by Congress in the near future. But see id. at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (conjecturing that the majority's holding "arguably protects" the Bill
Yellowtail ad that the McConnell Court considered the paradigmatic case of a sham
issue ad).
140. See id. at 2670.
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electioneering communication provisions of FECA would violate the
First Amendment if they were enforced against the plaintiff in the case.
Although the question decided in Wisconsin Right to Life is quite
different from the question examined in this Article, the two situations
have in common the propriety of relying on contextual inquiries for
purposes of determining whether an organization's political speech is
subject to regulation consistent with the First Amendment. At the same
time, the differences between the issues adjudicated in Wisconsin Right
to Life and the issues surrounding the classification of organizations as
political committees suggest that the Supreme Court's insistence on
disregarding context in the former situation will not necessarily carry
over to the latter.
First and foremost, the Court in Wisconsin Right to Life was
concerned that an "intent-and-effect" standard would introduce an
unacceptable amount of subjectivity into the analysis of political
speech.14' The Court asserted that, because of the nation's "profound
commitment" to robust debate on "public issues," interpretive
approaches such as safe harbors were preferred, and intent-and-effect
analysis was impermissible.14 2  Quoting Buckley v Valeo, the Court
concluded that an intent-and-effect standard "would afford 'no security
for free discussion."" 4 1 In contrast, the process of determining whether
an organization operating as part of a network should be classified as a
political committee would rely on relatively objective criteria. As noted
earlier, to determine an organization's correct classification, the FEC
would look at overlapping or shared directors and officers and similar
objective indicia of common management, as it already does when it
examines the relationships among organizations to ascertain whether
contribution limits are being evaded by affiliated organizations or to
permit distinct entities to fund a single PAC jointly. 144 It would look at
the representations that groups make to their supporters and potential
contributors about the nature of their activities and objectives, rather than
attempt to discern what people are thinking and how audiences are
reacting to them. For example, if an unregistered group operating as part
141. See id. at 2665-66, 2668.
142. See id. at 2665.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
of a network of affiliated entities promises its supporters that the impact
of their contributions, which will not be spent on express advocacy, will
nonetheless be to further the election prospects of one or more specific
candidates because of the aggregate impact of the activities of the
members of the network, then the aggregate impact of the network
relationships should be an important factor in the FEC's assessment of
the group's character. Similarly, if such a group focuses attention on its
relationship with its affiliated organizations-e.g., by sharing a
letterhead and logo, or by holding joint fundraising events that are geared
to the election or defeat of specific federal candidates-this conduct
should be considered as part of the process of classifying the group for
FECA purposes. Some of the FEC's inquiries would involve a greater
degree of judgment, however. For example, the FEC might look at
common patterns of contributions and contributors between and among
members of a network as part of its determination. Although such
considerations are arguably less objective because they are less clear cut,
the FEC already is required to make exactly such judgments to determine
how to treat related entities for other purposes. 45  The element of
judgment would be the greatest when the FEC engages in weighing the
various factors to make its final determination. Yet here too, the agency
would be engaging in exactly the kind of balancing that it undertakes
routinely as part of characterizing the relationships among related entities
for other purposes.146
Second, and relatedly, the Supreme Court in Wisconsin Right to
Life also expressed concern that the FEC's interpretation of the
electioneering communication provisions of FECA would open "the door
to a trial on every ad within the terms of [the definition of electioneering, ,. 1 4 7
communications].. The determination of an entity's classification, in
contrast, would have to be made only once or at infrequent intervals
because the basis for the determination would be structural rather than
transactional. The burden imposed would be no greater than occurs
currently when the FEC undertakes to ascertain the extent and character
of relations among two or more entities for purposes of other provisions
145. See id.
146. See, e.g., FEC Advisory Opinions 2007-13, 2005-17, 2004-41, 2002-15,
1996-50.
147. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2665-2666 (alteration added).
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of FECA. 14 When the classification is made at the entity level, rather
than at the level of specific communications, the goals or missions of
institutions are the object of inquiry, rather than the motivations behind
particular actions or actors. As a consequence, the type of evidence
implicated is different. When the parties disagree about the correct
assessment of an organization's mission, and thus about the validity of
the FEC's determination that an organization should be classified as a
political committee, the relevant contextual data will be derived from
relatively objective indicia, such as the organization's conduct (and the
conduct of the affiliated groups that comprise its network), rather than
the subjective criteria of individuals' thoughts and feelings. 49
Finally, in Wisconsin Right to Life, the FEC's contextual analysis
would have to be made during the two months preceding an election or
the month preceding a primary. At such times, it would be difficult for
the agency to render a decision quickly enough to satisfy First
Amendment concerns raised by restricting political speech on the eve of
an election. In contrast, members of a network could seek the FEC's
classification of their organizations before an election cycle begins or in
its early stages so that a decision could be rendered in time for the
entities involved to know which campaign finance regulations would
apply to each of them.
In short, the circumstances that caused the Supreme Court to
break the "tie"' 15 in favor of the speaker whose campaign speech in the
final two months of a campaign would be subject to the burden of being
funded with hard money if it aired its messages using broadcast media
need not be present in the context of classifying members of a network to
determine which ones, if any, must register with the FEC as a political
committee. When organizations operate through networks that are
commonly managed, the structural arrangements that they create and
through which they operate, and the representations about their mission
148. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
149. A network approach does, however, make certain assumptions about the
differing impact on candidates and officeholders of the activities of single
organizations as compared with those operating as part of a network that includes
entities explicitly attempting to influence the election or defeat of individual federal
candidates.
150. See Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2669, and n.7.
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that they make in public and private pronouncements, should contribute
to their classification for FECA purposes in the same way that the
character of their own activities contributes to that assessment. This
result is required by the need to prevent corruption and the appearance of
corruption in campaigns-the goal that both justifies and restrains the
regulation of campaign speech. 151  Thus, the Court's decision in
Wisconsin Right to Life should not be a bar to classifying individual
organizations active in political campaigns while operating as part of a
network based, in part, upon examining their network relationships.
CONCLUSION
The test of the preceding account of a network approach to
classifying entities as political committees is whether, or the degree to
which, they meet the objectives outlined in the beginning of this Article.
The single most important test of campaign finance restrictions is
whether they have as their touchstone avoiding corruption or the
appearance of corruption. The argument of Part I of this Article is that
the potential for corruption or its appearance during a campaign can be
magnified when politically active organizations operate as part of a
network. This is largely due to the circumstance that contributors to a
network's members may appear to be giving to individual candidates and
parties sums far in excess of the amounts permitted under campaign
finance contribution limits because they can augment the influence of
their hard money contributions with unlimited amounts of unregulated or
soft money. Because of the constitutional protections afforded political
speech by the First Amendment, those contribution limits have as their
sole justification preventing, or at least reducing, the opportunities for
corrupting or appearing to corrupt candidates for federal office. A
network approach to classification would contribute to the goal of
contribution limits by enabling the FEC to determine that an unregistered
or soft money organization has influencing the nomination or election of
specific candidates as its primary purpose based upon both the
organization's own activities viewed in isolation and its role in furthering
a joint enterprise with other members of the network, if such exists.
151. See supra Part I.
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The second objective of campaign finance regulation is to treat
similarly situated participants in campaigns equally. This entails judging
participants by the functions they actually perform rather than by their
titles or formal roles. It is the failure to assess participants by their actual
functions that creates loopholes or the ability of organizations, events,
and transactions to make misleading claims about their activities and
character. By the same token, it is the failure to assess campaign
participants functionally that creates public cynicism, since ordinary
citizens perceive a lack of reality when formal criteria triumph over
substantive ones, even if they are unable to articulate the difference. A
network approach would address this problem with the current tendency
to apply campaign finance regulations in a vacuum, that is, without
reference to context, by grounding campaign finance regulation in a
more realistic understanding of the character and conduct of entities
active in political campaigns.
The third test of campaign finance regulation is that it formulate
rules with sufficient clarity that participants in campaigns are on notice
of the legal standards by which they will be judged. This objective is
dictated by considerations of fairness as well as by the dictates of the
First Amendment. The approach advanced in this Article cannot claim to
achieve this goal perfectly. In fact, the very considerations that enable a
network approach to afford a more accurate account of which activities
and entities influence or seek to influence the prospects of specific
candidates also render the approach less mechanical and its
determinations less predictable. The goal of clarity, therefore, is in some
tension with the goals of preventing corruption and making judgments
based upon function rather than form. This tension is the inevitable
consequence of attempting to fashion rules to describe and order a
complex state of affairs, i.e., the conduct of political campaigns. This
tension should give regulators pause, but it should not cause them to
abandon hope for crafting a more realistic framework for campaign
finance regulation. A good first step would be to develop a procedure to
enable organizations already operating as part of networks or
contemplating a network arrangement to seek a determination from the
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FEC as to their classification before a campaign is in full swing, rather
than relying on an audit process after the fact."'
152. As was noted earlier, many related organizations already seek a ruling of
this kind from the FEC to determine whether the groups will be considered
"affiliated" for purposes of the contribution limits. See supra notes 118-122 and
accompanying text. To judge by the Advisory Opinions issued by the FEC in recent
decades, few groups request a ruling as to their classification as political committees.
On the relative competence of the IRS as compared with the FEC to regulate
political activity of 527 organizations, see Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned and
Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625 (2007).
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